INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses the UN Security Council's competences and powers to secure compliance with international humanitarian law. 1 In the first twenty years of its existence , which have been appropriately labeled the "tabula rasa period," 2 the Council totally ignored jus in bello issues. The first explicit reference to international humanitarian law in a Security Council resolution was in Resolution 237 (1967) following the Six Days' War in the Middle East, recommending that the governments concerned comply with the Geneva Conventions. 3 In the 1970s-1980s, the Council reluctantly started to engage with international humanitarian law: In Resolution 436 (1978) on Lebanon, for instance, for the first time it expressly referred to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 4 During this period, however, many armed conflicts involving violations of international humanitarian law were ignored by the Council or dealt with at a very late stage. 5 After the end of the Cold War, the Council's role as an "international policeman" became more palpable and expanded to very diversified situations, including violations of the laws of war. References to international humanitarian law in Security Council resolutions grew more frequent due to the proliferation of non-international armed conflicts generating an increasing number of civilian casualties. At the same time the Council started to make use of its Chapter VII powers. 6 The focus of the present Article is on the enforcement of international humanitarian law by the Security Council through coercive measures, rather than on other aspects of implementation: As noted by Abi-Saab, enforcement involves "exercising coercive 1 This Article uses "international humanitarian law," "jus in bello," "laws of war," and "law of armed conflict" synonymously. pressure on the deviant subject to realign his conduct to the prescriptions of the rules," while implementation, which is a broader concept, also includes "direct application by the subjects of the legal system, or the addressees of its rules" and "determinations by third parties-ideally judicial, but could be quasi-judicial instances as well-in case of dispute as to the proper application by the subjects." 7 In addition, this Article deals specifically neither with measures taken with regard to the protection of particular vulnerable groups (e.g., women and children), 8 nor with the role that the Security Council has played in the normative development of the law of armed conflict.
9 Section II determines the legal grounds of the Security Council's competence to enforce international humanitarian law, while Section III discusses Chapter VII measures that have been used to react to violations of the jus in bello. The problems related to the enforcement of international humanitarian law by the Security Council will finally be examined, in particular its selective approach and the instances in which the Council, instead of enforcing, has actually interfered with the application of the laws of war.
I. IS THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMPETENT TO ENFORCE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW? A. VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AS A "THREAT TO THE PEACE"
The UN Charter does not contain any express reference to international humanitarian law. If "respect for human rights" is mentioned among the purposes of the United Nations in Article 1(3), no mention of the laws and customs of war appears in either Article 1 or 2. This omission was intentional, as the drafters saw any reference to the jus in bello as an implicit recognition that, in spite of Article 2(4) and the collective security mechanisms provided in the Charter, armed conflicts could not be prevented.
10 "Human rights" have however been interpreted broadly in UN fora since 2010] the 1960s: the notion of "human rights in armed conflict," which includes international humanitarian law, was introduced at the 1968 UN International Conference on Human Rights in Teheran and was later reaffirmed in several General Assembly resolutions, starting with Resolution 2444 (XXIII) of December 19, 1968. 11 Resolution 9/9 (2008) of the UN Human Rights Council has also clearly stated that "conduct that violates international humanitarian law ... may also constitute a gross violation of human rights." 12 Nonetheless, the fact that promoting and encouraging respect for international humanitarian law can now be considered one of the UN purposes does not necessarily mean that the Security Council is competent to act to achieve that purpose. Indeed, the main responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter is to maintain international peace and security (Article 24(1)) rather than to ensure that hostilities are conducted in accordance with the jus in bello. The Charter, thus, makes the Council the arbiter of when armed force can be used, but does not say anything about how this force can be employed: 13 as noted by Judge Fitzmaurice, "[i]t was to keep the peace, not to change the world order, that the Security Council was set up." 14 In particular, the problem with using Chapter VII enforcement powers to secure compliance with international humanitarian law is that, as is well-known, according to Article 39 of the Charter those powers can be invoked by the Council only in case of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression," as their purpose is to keep the peace and not to enforce the law. 15 It is however quite possible that these two goals occasionally coincide. The question is whether a breach of international humanitarian law can be considered by the Security Council a "threat to the peace. Koskenniemi has highlighted the Security Council's "willingness to use its exceptionally 'hard' powers of enforcement, binding resolutions, economic sanctions and military force for 'soft' purposes of international justice."
19 He claims that "[t]he sense of 'peace' has been widened from the (hard) absence of the use of armed force by a State to change the territorial status quo to the (soft) conditions within which … peace in its 'hard' sense depends."
20 It can thus be argued that, although in principle the primary function of the Security Council is the maintenance of international peace and security, which is not necessarily identical to the remedying of internationally wrongful acts, in practice there has been a significant overlap, with the Council qualifying the most diverse breaches of international law as constituting threats to the peace. 21 The nexus between the maintenance of peace and 'humanitarian' considerations was initially emphasized in the 1992 statement by the President of the Security Council on behalf of its members:
The absence of war and military conflicts among States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security. The United Nations membership as a whole, working through the appropriate bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters.
22
Violations of international humanitarian law were expressly considered as a threat to the peace by the Security Council for the first time in Resolution 808 (1993) 
2010]
regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina. 23 The following year, Resolution 955 (1994) qualified violations of international humanitarian law committed in an internal armed conflict (Rwanda) as a threat to international peace and security. 24 In Resolution 1296 (2000) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of international humanitarian law were qualified for the first time as potentially constituting threats to the peace without reference to any specific conflict. 25 The Security Council's meeting records also show that several States have reaffirmed the link between the maintenance of international peace and security and compliance with international humanitarian law.
26
The question is, however, whether any violation of international humanitarian law can qualify as a threat to the peace in the sense of Article 39. Even though the Security Council enjoys a broad discretion in determining the existence of such a threat, 27 this kompetenz-kompetenz is not unlimited: a threat to the peace could not be "artificially created as a pretext for the realization of ulterior purposes." 28 40 It is to be observed, though, that the adoption of Article 41 measures on the basis of Article 94(2) would not be subordinated to the conditions spelt out in Article 39, i.e., the previous determination of the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression. 41 As to measures involving the use of force, it has been suggested that the Council could not 35 S.C. Res. 808 (supra note 23, at 2) with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina makes the example of mass killings and ethnic cleansing. France, sponsor of the resolution, declared that the violations of international humanitarian law in Bosnia were a threat to the peace because their commission would inflame the conflict (U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3175 (Feb. 22, 1993) resort to them to enforce an ICJ judgment in the absence of the preconditions listed in Article 39, as ICJ decisions are peaceful means to settle a dispute. 42 This conclusion cannot be accepted for several reasons. First, such an interpretation would make Article 94(2) largely redundant. Second, the provision under examination does not make any distinction among different Chapter VII measures. Finally, both sanctions and measures involving the use of force share the same rationale, as they are both measures taken against a State. . 43 In any case, given the broad interpretation of the notion of "threat to the peace" by the Council, the problem seems of limited practical relevance (Tanzi, supra note 40, at 561). 44 competences upon the Security Council that it does not already possess under the Charter, they would at least prevent States parties from claiming that when the Council adopts a resolution that tries to secure compliance with the international humanitarian law provisions contained in such instruments, it is acting ultra vires.
D. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AS REFLECTED IN ARTICLE 1 COMMON TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS
Neither Article 39 nor Article 94(2) of the Charter can found a general competence of the Security Council to enforce international humanitarian law, as the former only applies to serious and widespread violations amounting to a threat to the peace while the latter operates exclusively with regard to violations established in an ICJ judgment. The competence of the Security Council could however find a legal basis on customary international law, as reflected in Article 1 Common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection of Victims of War.
48 Indeed, the Charter is a treaty and, as such, can be modified by subsequent custom: informal modifications of the Charter were endorsed by the ICJ in the 1971 Advisory Opinion on Namibia with regard to Article 27(3). 49 If one admits that customary international law can modify certain Charter provisions like those on the UN organs' voting procedure and powers, 50 there does not seem to be any reason why such modification could not occur with regard to the provisions fixing the competences of these organs. This has for instance occurred at least the most serious violations of international (humanitarian) law is also contained in Article 41 (1) The ICTY further clarified that Common Article 1, as a "general principle," "lays down an obligation that is incumbent, not only on States, but also on other international entities including the United Nations." 54 Even though it cannot be construed as implying an obligation to act, the customary provision reflected in Common Article 1 constitutes a legal ground for the Security Council, as the UN organ provided with enforcement powers, to exercise such powers in order to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law "in all circumstances," whether or not the violations 
2010]
have a destabilizing effect on international peace and security and whether or not they have been established in an ICJ judgment. 55 Indeed, as argued by a commentator, the Council can act at the same time as an organ of a traditional international organization, entrusted by its members to pursue the purposes defined in its Charter and within the limits contained therein, and as a material organ of the international community for the protection of erga omnes obligations under customary international law: The exercise of new competences and powers by the Security Council should be seen as a manifestation of the latter phenomenon. 56 (2006)). Another commentator has also emphasized that "[t]he existence of community organs allows us to speak of an organized entity possessing a right, and the actual ability, to demand the performance of obligations erga omnes" (Fassbender, supra note 50, at 592) (emphasis added). See also the words of the Libyan representative during the debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict: "The international community, represented mainly by this Council, not only has the right to take measures but has the responsibility to act if the parties directly concerned have not managed to protect civilians or have shown a lack of will to do so" (U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess. invokes the notion of the "responsibility to protect" and declares that the international community is prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant international organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from … war crimes….
58
As can be seen, the paragraph does not expressly link the exercise of such responsibility to the maintenance of international peace and security. Although not binding, the document is important, as it reflects the consensus reached at the largest gathering of heads of State and government in history.
II. THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW THROUGH CHAPTER VII MEASURES
The Security Council has adopted a variety of measures in relation to international humanitarian law. It has for instance determined that international humanitarian law applies to certain situations 59 or that certain conduct amounts to a violation of international humanitarian law, 60 it has invited to consider to convene a meeting of 
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the High Contracting Parties to the IV Geneva Convention 61 and it has condemned or deplored violations and those who perpetrated them. 62 The Council has also set up fact-finding bodies (albeit that these have sometimes been preliminary to the adoption of coercive measures). 63 This exercise of a fact-finding function by the Council has at least partly remedied the paralysis of the International Fact-Finding Commission envisaged in Article 90 of Additional Protocol I, although it has also been noted that this practice of establishing ad hoc bodies is one of the factors that have condemned the Commission to inactivity. Although the importance of the above declaratory and fact-finding measures cannot be underestimated, this article will focus on the enforcement measures provided in Chapter VII aimed at forcing compliance by actors breaching the jus in bello. First, the Security Council has in various armed conflicts encouraged, urged, called on, demanded and requested belligerent States to comply with international humanitarian law (in general or with regard to specific instruments). 65 These calls could be adopted under Chapter VI but also under Chapter VII. 66 In Resolution 1265 (1999) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, for the first time the Council urged all States to respect international humanitarian law without reference to a specific conflict. 67 In some cases, the calls have been accompanied by the threat of the adoption of coercive measures in case of non-compliance: it has however been observed that these threats usually have a negligible effect on the conduct of those to whom they are addressed.
68
The Council has also on various occasions demanded that the belligerents take certain actions, e.g. prevent violations, 69 guarantee humanitarian access to the population, 66 In order to establish whether a resolution has been adopted under Chapter VII in the absence of an express reference, one should look, for instance, at whether the resolution also simultaneously adopts measures under Articles 40, 41 or 42, or whether it expressly qualifies the situation as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, or whether it refers to a crisis involving the use of armed force. 
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violations. 73 Again, these calls can range from mere recommendations to decisions adopted under Chapter VII. In some cases, the Council has even called upon States not involved in a given conflict to adopt certain measures, as in the case of the resolutions calling upon third States not to provide assistance to Israel in connection with settlements in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. 74 The most incisive measures at the disposal of the Security Council are however those provided in Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter VII. 75 As to the former, most of the sanctions regimes established after 1997 have had the purpose of limiting violence that had an impact on civilians. 76 In particular, at least four of the sanctions regimes created after 2004 (Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Somalia) are related to violations of human rights or international humanitarian law. 77 The problem with full-scale sanctions is that they may at the same time enforce international humanitarian law and have severe negative effects on civilians and vulnerable groups. 78 Two solutions have been engineered to solve this problem. The first is the inclusion of a humanitarian exception in the sanctions regime, in order to allow the provision of goods essential for the survival of the civilian population. 79 The second and now most popular solution is to replace indiscriminate measures with "smart" or "targeted" sanctions in certain cases accompanied by the authorization to use all necessary means to ensure their respect. 80 The sanctions regimes with regard to Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and DRC, for instance, provide for measures specifically targeting individuals and entities responsible for violations of international humanitarian law (including non-State actors), e.g. arms embargoes, bans on the export of natural resources aimed to finance conflicts, the freezing of financial assets and restrictions on flights and movement. 81 Their efficacy, which depends on their implementation by Member States, is however doubtful. 82 Another problem lies in the fact that targeted measures on individuals might amount to the imposition of penalties without due process guarantees: indeed, decisions on listing and de-listing targeted individuals and entities are taken by political organs (the sanctions committees) that do not disclose the reasons for their decisions, the listees are not represented in the procedure and no judicial review against the decisions is provided. 83 It is therefore not surprising that the World Summit Outcome Document 82 SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 76, at 27. In a recent debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, China declared itself "not in favour of the Council resorting to the use of or threatening the use of sanctions at every turn" (S/PV.6151, supra note 56, at 13). On whether economic sanctions are an adequate response to violations of international humanitarian law, see Bourloyannis, who argues that in cases of use of prohibited weapons or indiscriminate attacks on civilians an arms embargo seems appropriate, but if it is directed at all parties to the conflict it would disadvantage those belligerents that comply with international humanitarian law. On the other hand, an arms embargo only targeting those who breach international humanitarian law might alter the military balance between the parties. In case of violations of the law of occupation, a comprehensive economic embargo does not seem appropriate, as it would increase the suffering of the population living in the occupied territory and in the target state (Bourloyannis, supra note 5, at 354-55). reaffirmed the need for fair and clear procedures for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for removing them. 84 The 2006 Watson Report made a number of recommendations for reform with regard to the processes of notification, access, fair hearing and effective remedy. 85 Some of these procedural safeguards to protect individual rights were eventually adopted by the Security Council in Resolution 1730 (2006), by which the Council requested the UN Secretary-General to establish within the Secretariat a "focal point" to receive de-listing requests and perform the tasks described in the annex to the resolution. 86 The Security Council has also adopted other measures that can be ascribed to Article 41 but are not expressly mentioned therein. The most famous examples are the establishment of the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda in order to investigate and prosecute those responsible for grave violations of international humanitarian law 87 and the creation of the UN Compensation [t]he singling out of violations of humanitarian law as a major factor in the determination of a threat to the peace creates an important precedent, and the establishment of the tribunal as Commission for Iraq. 88 Furthermore, by Resolution 1593 (2005), acting under Chapter VII the Council referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC. 89 The ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have both held that the Council had not exceeded its powers when it created judicial organs to prosecute jus in bello violations. 90 According to the ICTY, in particular, the legality of the tribunals does not depend on the question whether these measures have been actually successful in securing compliance with international humanitarian law. 93 From this perspective, it has been claimed that there is "an evident trend towards militarization in the implementation of international humanitarian law." 94 In 1996, the ICTY amended its Rules of Procedure and Evidence and adopted Article 59 bis, which authorizes the arrest of ICTY indictees by international forces in the field when necessary to ensure the effective functioning of the Tribunal. 95 The Security Council has also repeatedly authorized UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement forces, state coalitions and regional organizations to use force if necessary to protect civilians and guarantee humanitarian access: The Council referred for the first time to the "protection [of] civilians under imminent threat of physical violence" and authorized a peacekeeping force to take "necessary action" to ensure such protection in Resolution 1270 (1999) establishing the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). 96 Although the language is not always consistent (apart from "necessary action," peacekeeping forces have also been authorized to use "all necessary means" or "all necessary measures" to implement their mandate), the inclusion of a protection mandate based on Chapter VII is now virtually standard in UN peace operations. peacekeeping mandate with a protection element needs be renewed. 100 Obviously, this broader peacekeeping mandate requires that peacekeepers be provided with all necessary resources to implement it: This does not seem to have been the case of UNAMID (African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur) which has made very little progress because of insufficient troops and assets and because of limited cooperation from Sudan. 101 As observed by the representative of Japan, "a substantial gap exists between the high expectations placed on a mission to carry out the mandate when the Security Council takes a decision and the actual implementation on the ground of those mandates."
102 It is therefore not surprising that the two recently published studies of the Department of Peace Keeping Operations try to address the operational challenges faced by UN operations in the implementation of robust mandates involving the protection of civilians in armed conflict.
103
It is worth recalling that Article 42 provides that it is only when Article 41 measures have proven, or are assumed, to be inadequate that measures involving the use of force can be taken, and only "as may be necessary. leaves the choice of means and their evaluation to the Security Council, which enjoys wide discretionary powers in this regard; and it could not have been otherwise, as such a choice involves political evaluation of highly complex and dynamic situations," 105 this discretion is not unlimited, both from the perspective of the Charter and of the "general system of law in which all international legal persons operate." 106 This means that the Security Council should not resort to coercive measures if the situation can be effectively dealt with through other means: minor or isolated violations of international humanitarian law could for instance be addressed through its peaceful settlement powers under Chapter VI. If adopted, coercive measures will have to be proportionate to the violation they react against, as "the Security Council, like other international legal persons, would be governed by the requirement that all use of force must be proportionate to its aim." 107 As a consequence, only the most serious and widespread breaches of the jus in bello would justify the adoption of military measures by the Council: indeed, "[m]ilitary enforcement action is a blunt instrument … [which] is unlikely of achieving results unless it is employed highly selectively." 108 
III. THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS AN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW ENFORCER: DOES IT REALLY WORK?
In spite of its broad powers, the role the Security Council has in fact played in the enforcement of international humanitarian law can be criticized from several points of view. First, the Council has acted in a selective and opportunistic manner. It has dealt with certain conflicts, but in others it has kept a very low profile or has not adopted any measure at all: divisions within the Council or lack of political interest have often constrained action. 109 Furthermore, the Council has tried to enforce certain jus in bello 2010] provisions and instruments but not others, 110 has condemned the violations committed by only one belligerent (e.g., in Iraq and Afghanistan), 111 has adopted coercive measures in certain cases but milder measures in other comparable circumstances without this being justified by the situation on the ground. 112 In the end, this "ad hoc-ism" 113 must be ascribed to the fact that the Council is a political organ, which the Charter does not require to be consistent or impartial. In practice, this means that the Council acts only when it is in the interest of its members: no obligation to take action exists, not even in the case of massive violations of international humanitarian law amounting to a threat to the peace. 114 As has been observed, to establish such obligation "the UN Charter would have to be rewritten, and even then it would be difficult in practice to force the Security Council to live up to its presumed obligation to intervene." 115 This selective and opportunistic approach of the Security Council with regard to, inter alia, the enforcement of international humanitarian law could in the end affect its legitimacy: even though "[n]o system of collective security can be realistically expected to respond to every transgression of the prevailing order or effectively respond to every breach of the public peace[,] … [it must nonetheless] show a reasonable degree of coherence, consistency and effectiveness." 116 the Council needs to have "a more consistent approach at the country-specific level" and that "we must abandon selective approaches to violations of international humanitarian law" (S/PV.6066, supra note 99, at 19-20). See also the statements of Nicaragua (S/PV.6151 (Resumption 1), supra note 26, at 16) and Pakistan (S/PV.6066 (Resumption 1), supra note 26, at 36), which highlight the inequity in the international response to gross violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. 110 The Security Council has mainly focused on the respect for the Geneva Law more than for the Hague Law (Cryer, supra note 63, at 274). 111 In another case, S.C. Res. 1603, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1603 (June 3, 2005), where the Council dealt with allegations of sexual offences committed by UN peacekeepers in Côte d'Ivoire, it "slipped into euphemism" and qualified those actions as "misconduct" and affirmed that the troops "should limit their behaviour," even though it had condemned violations of international humanitarian law by all the parties to the conflict in previous resolutions (Cryer, supra note 63, at 261).
112 COMELLAS AGUIRREZÁBAL, supra note 6, at 195-96. S.C. Res. 1860, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1860 (Jan. 8, 2009) on Gaza, for instance, does not mention the importance of respect for international humanitarian law, which led Switzerland to regret that references to the jus in bello, and to the Geneva Conventions in particular, "have become the object of political negotiation and discretion" (S/PV.6066 (Resumption 1), supra note 26, at 2).
113 Andrea Bianchi, Ad-hocism and the Rule of Law, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 263 (2002) . 114 See World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 58, para. 139 that affirms collective action through the Security Council under Chapter VII in reaction to the commission of war crimes will be taken "on a case-by-case basis." Such an obligation does not exist even when the Council acts under the customary provision reflected in Article 1 Common to the Geneva Conventions: see supra note 55. 115 Inger Österdahl, The Exception as the Rule: Lawmaking on Force and Human Rights by the UN Security Council, 10 J. CONFLICT SEC. L. 1, 14 (2005) . 116 Gill, supra note 42, at 129.
Second, the ICRC has emphasized that the measures adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII "cannot be considered neutral within the meaning of international humanitarian law, even though their ultimate objective may in some cases include the aim of putting an end to violations of that law." 117 In this regard, the ICRC has recommended clearly distinguishing between actions aimed at the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security and actions taken to facilitate the application of international humanitarian law, on the basis that the latter is founded on the belligerents' consent, while the former does not exclude coercion. 118 Finally, in certain cases the Security Council, far from securing compliance with international humanitarian law, has actually interfered with its application. In 2003, the Council adopted Resolution 1497, authorizing the establishment of a multinational force in Liberia in order to support the peace process in that country.
119 Paragraph 7 of the resolution provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of the contributing states which are not parties to the ICC Statute over current or former officials or personnel for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to the multinational force or United Nations stabilization force in Liberia, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by the contributing state. A similar paragraph was included in Resolution 1593 (2005) on Sudan by which the Security Council decided to refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC Prosecutor. 120 Neither Resolution 1497 nor Resolution 1593 provide for the obligation of a contributing State which is not a party to the Rome Statute to exercise its jurisdiction over the individuals in question: the exclusive jurisdiction of the contributing State might thus result in impunity. 121 It may be claimed that the above mentioned resolutions, insofar as they also relate to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, cannot be easily reconciled with Article 49 of the I Geneva Convention, Article 50 of the II Geneva Convention, Article 129 of the III Geneva Convention and Article 146 of the IV Geneva Convention, that provide though a small area in Southern Iraq was "actually placed under the authority" of Polish troops. 125 Similarly, Resolution 1546 (2004) considered to be terminated the occupation of Iraq as at the end of June 2004 even though little had changed on the ground (actual control being the sole factor determining the existence of belligerent occupation under Article 42 of the Hague Regulations). 126 The above cases raise the question whether the Security Council can set aside international humanitarian law when the maintenance of international peace and security in its narrow sense so requires. The preferable answer seems negative. The ICTY made clear that "neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives of the Security Council as legibus solutus (unbound by law)," 127 and it has already been seen that the obligation to respect international humanitarian law "in all circumstances" is incumbent not only on States but on the United Nations as well. 128 In relation to Resolution 1483, for instance, the representative of Pakistan in the Security Council emphasized that under the Charter the powers delegated by the Security Council under this resolution are not open-ended or unqualified. They should be exercised in ways that conform with "the principles of justice and international law" mentioned in article 1 of the Charter, and especially in conformity with the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Regulations, besides the Charter itself. 129 undoubtedly fair and is still valid today, at least with regard to the role that the Council has been playing in securing compliance with international humanitarian law. Indeed, the Security Council was not conceived as a law enforcer but as a peacekeeper that acts on political grounds: a lot depends on the interests of the permanent members and the reasons for acting or not acting are often not explained. 136 The political nature of the Council leads then to enforcement à la carte where certain situations are addressed but others are ignored.
This, however, does not necessarily mean that the Security Council can never play a constructive role in securing compliance with international humanitarian law, selective and imperfect as it may be: acting in one case may not be deemed inappropriate just because in other similar occasions nothing was done. The privileged position of the Council, which has exclusive competence to take coercive measures involving the use of armed force and whose decisions are binding on all UN Member States, makes it potentially a formidable instrument against serious violations of international humanitarian law, which can at least partly remedy the lack of enforcing mechanisms in the treaties on the laws of war, where compliance is mainly based on the goodwill of the states parties. One should also not forget the important role that the Council has played in trying to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law by non-State actors and in reaffirming that the jus in bello was applicable to specific conflicts and to certain reluctant States: under Article 25 of the UN Charter, such reaffirmations, when adopted under Chapter VII, also broaden the subjective scope of application of international humanitarian law treaties that are not universally ratified. Finally, the pressure of public opinion arising from a Security Council resolution upon the target State should not be underestimated.
It can thus be concluded that, if the primary responsibility for securing compliance with international humanitarian law still rests with the belligerents and with humanitarian organizations, 137 the Security Council can play a complementary role by
